Remarks by Consul General Deborah K. Jones at
Turkey-U.S. Public Policy Initiative Conference
Istanbul Policy Center

Istanbul
May 17, 2007

First of all, let me say thank you very much to Ustun Bey and to Sabri Sayari.  It’s a real pleasure to be with you, it’s a real honor to be with you at this 2nd Annual Istanbul Policy Center Conference, under the Turkish-US Public Policy Initiative. This Policy Center and others like it are important contributors to the development of Turkey’s civil society, at an extremely important time in the deepening of Turkey’s democracy and democratic institutions.  It’s important that we all talk to one another.  And, of course, what you’ve been discussing all day is also very important, at a time that has been an interesting time, to say the least.  But I would note that times have always been interesting in terms of the US-Turkish relationship.  In fact, if you take a long look at the relationship, it hasn’t always been roses and chocolates.  It’s gone through a number of patches, as one would expect from any relationship between two countries who are both large, diverse, dynamic democracies, in very different places in the world, with very different interests, at very different times.  What I’m going to suggest to you today, though –because some people have questioned the strategic nature of the relationship – is this indeed a strategic relationship? – is that it remains so.  I’m sure that theme has come up throughout the conference today.

First let me back up a little bit -- sorry – and interrupt my theme.  I do want to offer the following disclaimer to get  Sabri  off the hook here.  Sabri, as many of you know, was at the Foreign Service Institute for many years.  He was a master and literally the person who prepared and trained a generation of US diplomats to come out to Turkey.  Unfortunately, I came in out of the blue, out of the region, and I did not have an opportunity to meet Sabri, or to be trained by him prior to my arrival in Istanbul. So you cannot blame him for anything I’m about to say.  You’re off the hook, Sabri.  For the rest of you, please don’t fault the teacher here.

Now let me get back to the strategic nature of the relationship. What I’m going to suggest to you here - as I speak fairly quickly, because it’s the end of the day for you too – is that what used to be considered the strategic foundation or backdrop of the relationship was Turkey’s geographic location as a buttress against Soviet expansion in the region.  In other words, because of its location, Turkey was important, and was used as a platform for defense, in theory.  The fact of the matter is, thank God, that we never had to test whether the Soviets had nukes that they were going to launch at us, and whether we were going to launch nukes back at them.  So in fact, ironically, it was a strategic relationship that wasn’t tested to that degree.

I would further suggest that the strategic backdrop that today makes Turkey so important for the United States, and I think the United States so important for Turkey as well, is the fact that we are two secular democracies who share fundamental values, who share fundamental objectives in the region.  And so this strategic backdrop of being two like-minded nations, then, is what gives us the foundation to work on a number of tactical areas that are of great importance to both of us, as countries.  And I will go through and talk about some of those as well.

I thought it was interesting, as I understand it, that today you’ve discussed, among a number of things, the lobbies in the United States – which is also an indicator of the depth of the relationship. Gee, how many countries have five different lobbies working either for or against them in the United States, anyway?  And isn’t it about time that Turks themselves got a little more engaged?   I think that’s been one of the frustrations of Turks here, and of Americans who work for Turkish interests and the bilateral relationship, i.e. the relatively late engagement of concerned Turks and Turkish-Americans on issues important to them and to the relationship.  And I think you’ve also talked about student exchanges and the occasional difficulties of obtaining visas.  And I think it’s important to underscore, again, that Turkey still remains the number one country in Europe in terms of numbers of students in the United States enrolled in higher education.  We do work hard to make that happen, to facilitate that, and we believe that’s an important component of our “soft power” as well.  Because to know us may not be to love us, but it certainly is to better understand us, and to understand the dynamics that are going on in the overall relationship.

With respect to the press, which Sabri Bey has touched upon, I will offer yorum yok [no comment] because I must say that I have found the Turkish press to be a whole new universe.  I thought I had dealt with interesting press during 20 plus years in the Middle East, but I wasn’t prepared for the liveliness and creativity of Turkey’s press, I must say.

When I was invited to speak here, I was going to entitle my remarks, “Turkey and the United States: Allies, not Twins.” Because I think there are too many people who look for any distinctions or differences in approach and conclude there must be a split in the relationship, instead of saying this is an amalgam, like any marriage, like any partnership, like any alliance in which you seek a partner or you work with a partner who brings a different set of tools, a different set of skills, a different set of qualities, a different set of perceptions to the relationship.  And if you’re clever people, and if you’re mature, you learn how to use those as force multipliers.  And when you share fundamental goals, you use those force multipliers to achieve your shared goals in the broader world.

Obviously, all of you know the historical background of the relationship – I hope so. It didn’t start with grand strategies or grand measures; it started with working together to address what were the troubles of the times, which happened to be – and now perhaps we have come full circle – piracy, the terrorism of its day.  In 1830 we signed a “Treaty of Commerce and Navigation” with the Ottoman Empire, which dealt with the issue of piracy off the coast of Tripoli, which fell within the Ottoman realm.  And then that relationship expanded and diversified. Americans came to Istanbul and Anatolia about that same time to open schools and hospitals.  Ironically, these are the kinds of relationships we’re talking today about deepening and strengthening again:  the people-to-people relationships that will add to the texture of the fabric of our bilateral relationship. This is when Robert College, for example, which is the oldest American school outside of the United States, was founded in Istanbul, in 1863.  And I’m very proud of pointing out that Robert College graduates, I suspect, on a per capita basis, if you add them up, contribute more to Turkey’s economy than probably graduates from any other school in Turkey.  But it’s not only the economic prosperity or the creativity that Robert College and its students brought; it’s a way of thinking, which they continue to bring to the way business is conducted in Turkey, that’s really the critical thing.

Obviously, you all know about the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the bilateral relationship that was transformed by this, by Soviet aggression, by the US interest in supporting Turkey and supporting other countries. Some people have asked me, “Why was Turkey part of the Marshall Plan when they weren’t on our side, necessarily, in World War II?”  Well, neither were the Germans. They benefited hugely from it as well. And that development program laid the groundwork, not only with infrastructure, but for a way of thinking, a way of doing business, a way of interacting with the West, that was very important and that, again, added fibers and threads to the texture, the tapestry of Turkey’s engagement with the West.

I’m going to float over these things, which you all know, but before I do, I wanted to get back to what I said about the relationship not having always been easy. Many of you here are familiar with the famous “Johnson letter,” the arms embargo following the Cyprus intervention, and of course, most recently,  March 2003, and the failure of the Turkish parliament to allow US troops to enter northern Iraq through southern Turkey. That’s a difficult one for a US government official in my position, but I’ll take a risk and offer my frank, personal view.  I think that the fact that the military refused to step in was an important transitional moment in Turkish democracy.  I think it was an important lesson for both the United States and for Turkey.  I think that moment signaled the beginning of an important change in mentality, or change of decision-making process, which was critically important to Turkey’s deepening democracy.   I know some people will dispute that; some will point to the technical problem in the parliamentary process.  I know all the stories.  But whatever the reasons and the results, what’s important is that we’ve moved way beyond that in the bilateral relationship.  The United States certainly has moved beyond that, and I know that – despite the Suleymaniye incident that followed and continues to feed some movies and TV series here -- Turkey and the United States continue to move forward as good allies and partners.

What we did realize, however, following that episode and a period of about two or three years in between – was that things were not working as they should.  Certainly as Ambassador Wilson was arriving in Turkey in late 2005 there was a clear recognition on everyone’s part that the communication had broken down, that these two allies were not speaking to each other in the way that they needed to. And we all know that in any relationship -- be it a marriage, be it a company partnership, be it an alliance -- if you stop talking to each other, and you both have a lot of energy and a lot of ideas, and you have a lot of demands that you need to fulfill, as a country in this case, or as a government, you’re going to move in a direction and maybe move away from each other, or maybe move out of step with one another, and it’s going to cause misunderstandings. And of course, the press loves to focus on the misunderstandings and missteps.  The press loved to focus on the Hamas episode:  “Oh, look at the AK government; they invited Khalid Meshaal to come from Syria.”  But they didn’t focus on the Turkish government bringing together the Israeli and Pakistani foreign ministers in Istanbul.

Turkey has a unique role that it can play in many of these areas of shared concern.  What we realize, though, and what Ambassador Wilson realized early on, was that the US government needed to operate from a clear perspective on Turkey.  Sometimes the challenge on both sides -- if I may speak frankly to this group, while recognizing that we have press here – is that sometimes there’s almost too much open dialogue and discussion about what’s going on in the relationship. And I think that’s the difficulty of conducting diplomacy in a modern world:  there is so much transparency involved that sometimes small differences of opinion, or small divergences of approach, or perhaps not so small, take on a much greater weight as stories than they should, because they’re not final decisions or final expressions of policy. When I was Public Affairs Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for the Near East Bureau, for example, one of the things that always struck me was that the press was very good about finding facts or uncovering incidents that had occurred. What they were less accomplished at, was putting together why those things had happened the way they had, in other words, what it meant, or where there facts stood in the overall process. As a result, two plus two always equaled five in many journalists’ equations. Unfortunately, what often happens is that someone will pick up on a fact that then takes on a life of its own, a larger importance than it merits, because someone delights in pointing out our differences in tactics rather than our similarities in shared, fundamental goals.

In any event, though, to address this communications issue, the Ambassador undertook, with the Secretary of State and Foreign Minister Gul, to produce what they called a “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue” roadmap. And this was designed precisely to address many of the issues which I believe have been raised in this conference today, many of the things you have discussed.  It was a means of detailing our mutual plans – mutual and jointly agreed to – plans for a dialogue to advance this partnership, which Secretary Rice has designated a strategic partnership for many of the reasons I have described.  The document establishes that this is a relationship characterized not only by strong bonds of friendship and alliance, mutual trust and unity of vision, but by the same set of values and ideals, and regional and global objectives.  The promotion of peace, democracy, freedom and prosperity.  Of course, one could add apple pie.  Who can disagree with any of those?  But nonetheless, we share a similar approach. We noted that we share common challenges and opportunities that demand concerted efforts between the two of us.  These challenges and opportunities then form the specific items of a common agenda.  And let me name some of those items on our common agenda, where, as I indicated before, based on a strategic backdrop of shared values, we need to move together tactically. And I’ll offer one caveat on this at the end, too:  to promote peace and stability in the broader Middle East; to support international efforts toward a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including international efforts to resolve the conflict on the basis of a two-state solution – we both support the President’s two-state vision of two democratic, stable countries living side by side in peace; to foster stability, democracy and prosperity in a unified Iraq – and let me underscore for the press here -  unified Iraq – all together, Kurd, Shi’a, Sunni, as it has always been; to support diplomatic efforts on Iran’s nuclear program – and again, let me say that Turkey has been completely in step in terms of the international community’s and the UN’s goals in response to Iran’s efforts to create nuclear weapons; to contribute to stability, democracy and prosperity in the Black Sea region, the Caucuses, Central Asia and Afghanistan; to support the achievement of a just and lasting, comprehensive and mutually acceptable settlement of the Cyprus question under the auspices of the UN, and in that context, to end the isolation of Turkish Cypriots; to enhance energy security through diversification of routes and sources, including the Caspian basin; to strengthen trans-Atlantic relations in the transformation of NATO and how it operates and its focus – and again, Turkey is one of the top five NATO countries in terms of the amount of its military size and capacity, and the amount of its gross domestic product it spends on its military; to counter terrorism, including the fight against the PKK and its affiliates – I’m happy to take questions afterwards; to prevent weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation; to combat illegal trafficking of persons, drugs and weapons; to increase understanding, respect and tolerance between and amongst religions and cultures – that falls into the civil society role; to promote effective multilateral action to find solutions to international challenges, crises of common concern – that’s a broad one; and obviously, to support Turkey’s accession to the European Union – this is hugely important for the United States.  

As I speak to Turks, frankly, for many of them, the steps along the way may be as important or more important than the goal. But we in the United States happen to believe that Turkey is a natural partner for the EU, that membership will strengthen Turkey and strengthen the EU, and as a result make the world a better place, more prosperous and safe for all of us.  We also believe that the EU process encourages Turkey in its own reform within its society, to make it more democratic, more market-oriented, and more deeply anchored in the trans-Atlantic community. Also, the Shared Vision statement gives particular emphasis to economic and commercial relations and investments, and defense and military cooperation, as always; science and technology and public diplomacy efforts and exchanges. In connection with this, we have included several mechanisms – an Economic Cooperation Partnership Council, Trade and Investment Framework Agreement , and a High-level Defense Group to work on those areas of shared concern. There was also agreement that there would be regular, expert-level consultations on issues of common concern.; that there would be planning consultations on issues of policy concern, and that there would be broad-based dialogue through our greater focus and promotion of bilateral exchanges amongst business groups, media, civil society, scientists, engineers, academicians, think tanks, educators and students.  We also agreed to mutually facilitate – and this has happened, and this is in line with the last thing that you were talking about – the dialogue between the US Congress and Turkish Grand National Assembly – because I will share with  you as well a dirty little secret:  most Americans don’t understand the workings of our Congress, either, and that includes Foreign Service officers, who probably only after they have been in the Service for 12 or 15 years finally figure out what the appropriations process is.  The legislative process is very complicated in the United States, and we often learn more as we come overseas and try to explain it to people. But it’s a little bit like explaining baseball to non-Americans, or for us, to have the British explain cricket.  It never seems to make much sense unless you’re actually involved in the process.

In any case, this kind of regular and renewed dialogue, talking to each other – and I think if you look over the past 18 months you will see that there has been in fact, a steady up tick in the number of senior-level American visitors who have come to Turkey, and in the number of Turkish visitors who have gone to the United States, and in the kinds of exchanges we’ve had all along at all levels -- helps.  One of the focuses we’ve had at the Consulate here, for example, has been to reach out to a “broader audience,” as we call it.  This doesn’t mean reaching out to the “covered” versus the “uncovered.”  It is exactly what it says – reaching out to the broader audience of the Turkish people, because we recognize that, like the United States, you are an extraordinarily diverse society, with people having all kinds of approaches.  We’ve seen that very clearly more recently.  It’s been an extraordinarily exciting time for us to serve in Turkey and to be with you here as you live through what I think is a hugely important time in your democratic deepening and transition as a country.  So with those words, and with a lot of optimism, frankly, about the nature of the relationship, I will close.  Because this relationship is like many of our relationships, and shares the nature of relationships between grown-up democracies:  they may differ, they may disagree on some points, but hopefully they talk on the basis of shared foundations. And again, as I say hopefully, I believe and we believe, that the amalgam, the different strengths, the different perspectives Turkey and the US bring to the table can contribute to our capacity to address problems in this part of the world together, to address the challenges – and I’m always reluctant to use that word knowing it doesn’t exist in Turkish – but to address the challenges that we all confront, as strategic, democratic, freedom-loving partners in this part of the world. And on that Pollyanna-ish, upbeat note, I’m happy to take questions if anyone’s not bored or too exhausted to ask any, at this stage of the day.

Question: Thank you very much. My question is, we’ve earlier on discussed –actually we didn’t, I, in my presentation, mentioned-- that some Turks are rather disappointed with the United States’ stance towards the e-memorandum. And while the EU came out strongly in favor of a pro-democracy stance as soon as it got out, how could one explain the United States’ initial –the first week I think it was- and then later on they [inaudible] something. How could it be explained that it was not as strong as the EU came out? Thank you.

Consul General Jones: The e-memo.  Let me say, first of all, that what is happening in Turkey right now is obviously a matter for the Turks.  We are observers here.   As the Secretary said, and I think it’s been clear from previous US positions, we have an interest in Turkey being secular, in Turkey being democratic, and in Turkey operating according to its constitutional structure and guidelines, just as we would, in the United States.  Anyone who knows the United States, or has observed us, should understand by this time that we don’t support military intervention in elections – that disrupt ongoing elections.  However, I think it’s important to distinguish: right now, Turkey is engaged in a very orderly process with the EU on accession under Copenhagen criteria.  And I think it’s very explicit in those criteria, what some of the concerns are about elections and the military.  So in an interesting way, the EU -- although I can’t speak for them -- may have felt it within their realm to make a comment on something that, frankly, the US did not believe it was appropriate to comment on.  When the Secretary came out, they asked her about the EU comment, she made reference to that, and she said, “Yes, we would be in the same line of thinking.” I think many people thought that was self-evident. I know that Turks were very disappointed that there was not more of a statement.  But I would also say that my experience here is that no matter what we say, it is taken as a wink and a nod in one direction or another.  And sometimes it is best to say nothing.  Because our actions should speak for themselves, and the way our democracy operates speaks for itself.  And I think that in our relationship with Turkey, we don’t have a dog in the fight, or as we say, we don’t have a horse in this race, other than the ballot box – that we believe that secular democracies that have constitutions should operate in accordance with their guidelines.  Period.  I don’t think it’s a mystery.  I suppose we must be in the right spot, when both sides are criticizing us: the very clever banners that said, “ABDullah Gul,” and then on the other side, people suspecting that we had some agenda to promote the military.  No.  We do have an agenda, however;  it’s called the ballot box.  We want Turkey to be strong, democratic, secular, and constitutional.  That gets complicated, and I know that gets fuzzy, on the constitutional part, especially.  That’s where we are on that. 

I would refer you to what the Ambassador said earlier:   this isn’t about us.  This process in Turkey right now is not about the United States; it’s about you. It’s about Turks.  Keep the focus where it belongs. And I think it’s terrific and it’s exciting, what’s happening, although I recognize it may be troubling to some.